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 Abstract 
This paper provides a comprehensive description of the financial environment for households 
and small businesses in a defined geographical region.  It develops a new, functional 
approach to financial access surveys, which involves asking detailed questions about how 
respondents meet their financial needs—from purchasing inventory to paying for large, 
medical expenses—rather than focus on a narrow set of financial products.  This approach 
identifies innovative financial tools which arise in response to their needs that traditional 
surveys miss, and is a scalable complement to financial diaries and other more detailed 
approaches.  From here, we survey the providers of finance, ranging from large state and 
private banks, to moneylenders, shopkeepers and other households, with the aim of 
developing the first comprehensive approach to mapping an area’s financial landscape.  The 
primary contribution of this work is methodological; however, we describe preliminary 
findings from the pilot regions before concluding with recommendations for additional 
analysis and scaling up of the methodology. It helps examine in a direct way the challenges 
of designing policy to improve the way households can manage risk and savings and small 
firms can respond to investment opportunities.  Both the approach itself and the findings that 
arise are likely to influence not only the way data are gathered in the future but also the way 
in which policies are designed for inclusion and growth.  
 1. Introduction 
Finance serves a long and often-recited list of goals.  It mobilizes savings, allocates funds to 
their most productive uses, and facilitates exchange.  It is central to risk management: 
allowing firms and farms to manage exchange risk, protect against the loss of productive 
assets, and insure against productivity shocks such as drought or flood.  It allows households 
to smooth consumption and manage risks such as the death of a primary earner, health shocks, 
or the loss of housing or livestock.  It facilitates investment, be it a poor household investing 
in their children’s education, a farmer purchasing fertilizer or a medium-sized firm upgrading 
its machinery.  With these goals in mind, access to finance is widely considered to be a 
critical component in the development process based on the accepted belief that it directly 
improves welfare and encourages growth. A household that cannot manage finance in the 
place of shocks risks a child dropping out of school or loss of land: crucial issues or inclusion. 
A small firm or farm that cannot respond to an investment opportunity loses out on rising 
income and growth. 
Yet our measures of access remain rudimentary and incomplete.   Individuals are often 
defined as having access based entirely on whether or not they currently maintain a formal 
deposit account.  In some cases, average distance from households to an ATM serves as a 
measure of financial access.  While access to and use of such formal accounts are indeed one 
useful dimension in understanding the role of finance in development, they are incomplete.  
Individuals in less-developed countries use a surprising range of formal and informal 
products and services to meet their financial needs.  Surveys such as FinScope take an 
important step in fleshing out our understanding by asking a richly detailed set of questions 
covering the most common formal and informal financial products in each country where the 
survey is conducted.  But even the best surveys of this sort are lacking in three respects. 
First, individuals, households, farms and firms in LDCs use a myriad of creative and 
complex tools to meet the two broad goals of finance: (i) the mobilization of assets and 
efficient allocation of capital; (ii) moving income streams across time or states of nature.  
However, most existing research focuses on a pre-specified set of products and services, 
thereby presenting an incomplete and often misleading picture of how finance truly works.1 
Put another way, if individuals had access to secure savings and flexible loans at reasonable 
rates through a reliable informal mechanism unknown in Western countries, it is not clear we 
would care if they had a savings account at a formal bank.  Second, surveys have tended to 
focus on individuals rather than firms, leaving out a key element for economic growth.  
While there have been some attempts to measure firms’ access to finance specifically,2 it is 
critical to recognize the often blurry lines between firms, farms and households.  A spouse’s 
wage income may be used to purchase inventory for the family business or proceeds from a 
loan intended to purchase an income-generating asset used to pay school fees.  We can only 
understand how access to finance affects development with data collection methods that 
recognize and are robust to these indistinct boundaries. Third, research on access to finance 
                                                 
1
 Collins et al’s (2009) “Portfolios of the Poor” is a notable exception focusing on the financial lives of poor 
individuals.  
2
 FinScope has begun to expand into small business financial surveys, which, though largely distinct from 
their individual surveys, may prove of great value.  The IFC conducts extensive work on a range of access to 
finance advisory services to MSMEs including SME banking advisory work, microfinance, leasing, housing 
finance and credit bureaus. 
has largely ignored the supply side of the market.  When research has focused on the supply 
side, it has tended to take a narrow perspective (e.g., focusing on microfinance) and thus has 
been able to say little about questions of general equilibrium, substitutes and complements, 
and industry dynamics that span multiple products. 
This report describes a pilot study that begins to fill these gaps.  First, the core survey 
instrument targets households and businesses3 in a defined geographical region using a 
survey built on the functional uses of finance.  For example, rather than ask about a specific 
product such as trade credit from a supplier or a formal savings account, the survey asks 
specific questions about how a firm financed its last inventory purchase or how an individual 
paid for recent medical treatment.  Importantly, this allows the researcher to be surprised by 
creative approaches to finance.  Targeted surveys and careful qualitative field work have 
identified the importance of funeral societies in Ethiopia or flexible credit terms in northern 
Nigeria (Udry 1990; Dercon, De Weerdt et al. 2006). Third, this survey targets the sources of 
finance (e.g., moneylenders, two-wheeler leasing agents, and providers of gold loans) to 
refine the picture of financial access.   
The demand-side sample frame for the pilot project comprises all households and 
businesses in a defined geographical region.  The supply-side sample frame covers all firms 
or individuals providing financial services or products in this region, regardless of whether 
they are physically located in the region.  These firms or individuals have been identified 
through the demand-side surveys and through competitor/alternative-supplier questions on 
the supply side.  While every effort has been made to identify a typical region for the sample, 
the survey is not representative.  Rather, the aim is to provide as complete of a picture as 
possible for the chosen region. The survey team completed primary field work in January 
2011 and data entry in March 2011.   
While the depth of this survey requires a narrow focus, the aim of this pilot project is to 
determine how to best capture information about financial access that is missed by current 
methodologies.  Unless we accurately see the purposes of finance, how households and firms 
pursue these aims, and how the supply and demand of finance really interact, policy can 
easily become disconnected from its goal of advancing development, encouraging growth, 
and alleviating poverty.  It is essential to recognize that the structure of data capture largely 
determines our ability to produce credible and actionable information. One aim of this study 
is to reaffirm and strengthen the connection between data gathering and policy goals for 
financial access. 
A key example of the way in which this type of information could, in principle, influence 
policy lies in financial aspects of the investment climate. Improvements in the investment 
climate—from a more reliable electricity supply to fewer visits from government officials—
can significantly increase investments by small and medium enterprises.  Recognizing this, a 
great deal of policy has focused on improving firms’ ability to finance investment 
opportunities. However, if we do not understand firms’ perceived financial needs and how 
resources are managed on both sides of the market, then policy design will likely miss crucial 
issues and be much less effective. Both growth and inclusion would suffer. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews the current state of 
work measuring access to finance and describes the methodology of the functional approach.  
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 Some respondents in the pilot survey area engaged in agricultural activities, but these were modest and 
none could appropriately be considered farms.  However, the methodology employed can be easily extended to 
farms and households engaged primarily in agricultural activities. 
While this report focuses on methodology, section 3 describes the pilot sample and, with the 
qualification that data analysis remains in process, section 4 discusses key observations to 
date.4  The final section describes the additional outputs that are expected from this project 
over the next 12 months, discusses methodological lessons, and recommends next steps to 
push forward.  The key deliverable is a hybrid survey that improves the current standard of 
quantitative questions and adds a small set of qualitative questions that augment the 
quantitative results and are robust to different settings.  We will then seek to extend the 
survey to other areas in India and to different countries (e.g., Ghana, Tanzania, Ethiopia, 
Mexico, and Pakistan) to allow for comparative analysis and to inform diverse future research 
on access to finance. 
2. A functional approach to supply and demand 
As Karlan and Morduch note, much hope has been placed on the transformative power of 
access to finance.  This hope is epitomized by the intense interest and microcredit, the 
provision of small loans to typically poor borrowers in poor countries.  But careful, recent 
work on the impacts of microcredit suggest a more cautious view(Banerjee, Duflo et al. 2010; 
Karlan and Zinman 2010).  More broadly, it is generally accepted that access to finance is 
closely linked to growth and poverty alleviation.  Economic theory regarding the impact of 
reducing financial frictions and alleviating credit constraints is clear (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; 
Besley 1995; Ghatak and Guinnane 1999).  Numerous cross-country studies have 
documented a robust correlation between financial depth and growth.5  But a causal link from 
financial development to growth is harder to establish due to well-understood problems of 
reverse causality and omitted variables.  Those studies that attempt to tackle the causal 
question head-on support the conventional wisdom—financial development appears 
important for growth.6  However, a clear, micro-level understanding of the mechanisms is 
still wanting.  For example, Burgess and Pande’s (2005) study of India’s rural bank branch 
expansion policy between 1977 and 1990 is often cited as evidence that access to finance 
reduces poverty.  However, the authors themselves caution that the results may be due to the 
fact that 40% of borrowers in new branches never repaid their loans and hence effectively 
benefited from a large cash transfer.   Even absent this caveat, leveraging these findings into 
effective policy requires understanding how individuals benefited from the presence of banks.  
Did they utilize more effective savings mechanisms?  Substitute away from high-cost 
informal loans?  Benefit from more robust risk sharing and insurance?  Find employment in 
firms founded or expanded with loans from new branches? 
On one hand, the policy and research community is approaching these questions through 
careful evaluations of specific programs.  Good progress is being made here.  Exemplary 
studies include Banerjee et al’s (2010) evaluation of a traditional, group-based microfinance 
program in Hyderabad, Karlan and Zinman’s evaluations of consumer loans in South Africa 
(2010) and microenterprise loans in the Philippines (2010), Dupas and Robinson’s work on 
savings in Kenya (2009), and Ashraf et al’s study of commitment savings products in the 
Philippines (2006).  On the other hand, there remains a collective need to do a much better 
job building descriptive data to understand what access to finance really means.  This 
includes documenting contractual terms, costs, frictions, usage patterns and limitations to 
various financial products. 
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 Data collection for the pilot was completed in early March 2011. 
5
 See Levine (2005) for a summary of this research. 
6
 Examples include Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Wurgler (2000). 
Supply-side, macro measures such as population per bank branch or mean distance to 
nearest financial institution allow convenient comparisons across regions or countries, but the 
picture they provide is at best incomplete.7  For a stark if somewhat casual example, consider 
an individual who sleeps in an ATM vestibule.  Despite this proximity, he is almost certainly 
excluded from the financial system.  More seriously, consumers in Western Europe are 
increasingly indifferent to bank placement because of online banking and the near universal 
acceptance of debit cards.  In Kenya, clients of mPesa are not only holding but using less 
cash because they can rely on mobile banking for a new transaction modality.  Access to 
finance remains of prime importance to these clients, but it is determined by a diverse set of 
agent points rather than the traditional bank network.  Importantly for this study, 
conventional measures of financial access overlook novel solutions to financial needs.  
Existing surveys can be updated to include specific questions about new or previously 
unknown products, but they are necessarily reactive.  A key goal of the functional financial 
access survey is to provide a systematic method to identify and describe emerging and 
innovative financial products.  As such, it can be seen as a complement to broad, demand-
side surveys such as FinScope and the World Bank’s Global Financial Inclusion Indicators.8 
These surveys play an important role, but are limited in their ability to identify evidence 
gaps and inform policy.  FinScope, for example, provides excellent data on what percentage 
of individuals have formal bank accounts.  Improving on previous studies, it even provides 
some information on barriers to financial access such as self-reported reasons for not saving 
formally.  But additional information is necessary to translate this information into either 
further research or a policy response.  When individuals say they do not save because they do 
not have sufficient funds, is this because minimum balances are too high, because transaction 
costs are large relative to account balances, or because of some other non-convexity in the 
returns, real or perceived, to savings?  When individuals say they do not borrow because they 
“don’t believe in it”, what is it they do not believe?  That the returns justify the interest 
expense, that borrowing is ever a good option, or that potential lenders are trustworthy?  
Standard data collection tools tend to focus on a pre-specified set of products and services.  
This is necessary for short, wide surveys, but it presents an incomplete and potentially 
misleading picture of how finance truly works.  Put another way, if individuals had access to 
secure savings and flexible loans at reasonable rates through a reliable informal mechanism 
unknown in western countries, it is not clear we would care if they had a savings account at a 
formal bank.  There are, of course, notable exceptions.  Collins et al’s (2009) Portfolios of the 
Poor develops a set of year-long financial diaries from villagers and slum dwellers in 
Bangladesh, India and South Africa that track how households manage basic needs and 
accumulate assets at the transactional level.  Of note, they capture how households actually 
use finance for specific needs such as putting food on the table each day despite highly 
variable income, paying lumpy school feels or festival expenses, or coping with illness and 
old age.  Ruthven (2002) takes an anthropological approach to studying the financial services 
used by inhabitants of a squatter settlement in West Delhi.  Similar to both of these, we will 
begin to document the myriad innovate ways in which households meet their financial needs 
and, more importantly, to propose a systematic way to gather data about them. 
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 See, for example, the IMF’s Financial Access Survey (http://fas.imf.org/) or CGAP’s series of reports on 
financial access (http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/financialindicators/).   
8
 The World Bank’s Development Research Group, supported by a ten-year grant from the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation, has developed a financial access survey module, which will be included in the Gallup World 
Poll and addressed to at least 1,000 people per country in 150 countries beginning in 2011. 
It is worth reiterating that there is nothing per se good about a formal savings account or 
any other financial product.  Financial services are only valuable to the extent they serve a 
consumer’s needs.  That is, they must allocate capital efficiently, allow her to transact, and to 
optimally move income across time and states of nature.  These are the goals of any financial 
system, and assessing how well they are met should be the ultimate aim of any study of 
access to finance. 
While much of the work on access to finance has centred on specific financial products, 
e.g., formal savings accounts, it has generally avoided further exploration into the supply side 
of the market.  Exceptions have tended to take a narrow perspective, e.g., focusing on 
microfinance, and have thus been able to say little about supply-side constraints.  The current 
literature commonly groups consumer answers such as “too high fees” or “difficult to access” 
as supply-side constraints when discussing barriers to financial access.  However, in addition 
to lacking specificity and context, these responses describe the current market equilibrium, 
e.g., high transaction fees, and not the specific market or organizational features that give rise 
to such barriers.  At best, they signal the need for additional evidence on which to base policy 
prescriptions.  A narrow, product focus also makes it difficult to address issues of general 
equilibria, substitutes and complements, and industry dynamics that span multiple products.  
There is a tendency to think about access to finance in the context of financial services used 
in the West.  Markets are much more creative than this. 
Our functional approach to access to finance begins with the recognition that finance 
exists to either allocate capital to its most productive use or to move flows of income across 
time or states of the world.  Frictions reduce efficiency, but there is no a priori best product to 
serve these aims.  As such, instead of asking about particular products, we ask how 
individuals address 34 specific needs where finance may serve an enabling role.9  When was 
your last large medical expense and how did you pay for it?  How do you buy inventory for 
your business?  How do you (or your parents) expect to manage your basic needs in old age?  
When was your last major festival, how much did you spend, and how did you pay for it?  
How do you pay for routine expenses such as food between when you are short of funds? 
Through this process we identify the range of financial products, formal and informal, 
that individuals use to meet their needs.  We then augment this list by asking about specific 
financial products that may have been missed, e.g., do you belong to a chit fund?  These 
questions capture few overlooked products—the 34 functional questions cast a broad net—
but are used to probe financial histories, demand, and reasons for non-usage.   
From these two sets of questions, we build a complete list of the financial products used 
by the household.  We then ask about the specific terms and usage of each of these products.  
To build our understanding of the supply side, we also ask about alternative providers and 
other market conditions.  These questions are tailored to specific provider/product types: 
savings; formal loans; self-help groups and microfinance providers; informal lenders; chit 
funds; credit cards; insurance; shop credit and employers; and individuals.  Box 1 shows the 
questions asked regarding informal lenders, and sections F and G of the household survey in 
Appendix 4.1 contain the full detail. 
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 See Appendix 4.1 for a complete list of household survey questions. 
 As described above, this approach is a complement not a substitute for short, wide panel 
surveys.  It aims to provide a wide funnel with which to identify market failures, supply and 
demand constraints, and innovative financial solutions that would be missed by necessarily 
narrow, fixed-response surveys.  The implementation of this approach can best be seen in the 
actual survey implementation, the topic of the next section.     
3. The pilot sample 
We conducted the pilot in Ghola, Sodepur, North Twenty Four Parangas, a peri-urban area 
16km north of central Kolkata.  The area comprises a variety of household income levels, 
businesses, religions, and castes, providing a diverse sample and facilitating generalizability 
of the survey methodology.  We conducted a census of the area, identifying approximately 
600 households and 150 small shops and businesses.  Within Ghola, we targeted two 
Box 1: Detailed questions regarding providers of informal loans. 
• Do you currently have any loans outstanding with [this individual]?   
• What was the loan used for?   
• What would you have done if you didn’t get this loan?   
• How much did you borrow? How much did you ask for?   
• If different, why (Probe: fees, bribe, interest up front, source did not have sufficient funds, 
source wouldn’t allow additional borrowing)?  Follow up for bribes, fees or source 
wouldn’t lend more answers.  Why?     
• How did you receive the money?   
• How much do you currently owe?   
• What is the interest rate on the loan (check time period)?   
• What is the repayment schedule (how often, size of payments)?   
• If you do not have enough funds to make a scheduled payment, what do you do?   
• If you were not able to repay this loan, what would you do?  What would happen?   
• When will the last payment be made?   
• How do you make the payments?  Do you have to travel to make the payments?  How 
often?  How far?   
• Did you have to pay any extra fees to get the loan?  What were they for (processing, bribe, 
other)?  How much were the fees?   
• When did you first borrow from this lender?   
• Why did you originally borrow from them? How did you find out about them?   
• How much did you borrow originally?     
• Describe your borrowing history with this source.   
• How many loans have you taken?   
• Has the amount changed over time? How?   
• Has the interest rate changed over time?   
• Has the collateral changed over time?   
• Have the repayment terms changed over time?   
• Has anything else about the loans changed?   
• What could this lender do to serve you better?   
• What is the most credit [this individual] would extend to you?   
• Are there others that you could use to provide a similar service?  If so, why do you use 
your current provider?   
 
neighbourhoods: Musalman Para (“Muslim part”) and Khudiram Nagar, a predominantly 
Hindu area.10  While every effort was made to identify a typical region for the sample, the 
survey is not representative.  Rather, the aim was to provide as complete of a picture as 
possible for the chosen region and to test a survey instrument that could be generalized. 
For the demand side of the survey, we attempted to reach all households and businesses in 
these neighbourhoods.  The supply side of the survey was defined by a “random walk”.  For 
all sources of finance identified by the demand surveys, we gathered precise identifying 
information from respondents.  These included formal sources of finance (such as banks and 
insurance companies), semi-formal providers (such as MFIs and non-bank finance 
companies), and informal sources (such as money lenders and other households).  The full 
survey required an average of two hours to complete.  Surveyors wrote responses to closed-
end questions such as gender or religion, digitally recorded the full audio of the interview,11 
and collected GIS positioning data for all respondents. 
Survey teams then interviewed as many of these sources of finance as possible given 
administrative constraints.  They concentrated on products and services offered, prices, costs, 
clients populations targeted, and the operation details of the enterprise.  Particular attention 
was given to contract terms, payment enforcement, client selection criteria, and products 
specifically targeted at lower-income populations. In addition, we explored the sources of 
finance for the providers themselves as well as managers’ professional histories.12 
Substantive field work concluded in January 2011, and we completed quantitative data 
entry and interview translation in March 2011.  In total, the survey covers 156 households 
and businesses on the demand side.  On the supply side, it includes 180 shopkeepers (many of 
these overlap with those surveyed on the demand side), 7 banks, 12 moneylenders, 15 
providers of other semi-formal financial services (including chit funds, microfinance 
institutions, insurance companies and other non-bank finance companies), and 44 employers. 
4. Key lessons to date 
The following section summarizes key lessons from our preliminary analysis of the pilot data.  
Interpretation of these findings requires two cautions.  First, results are preliminary and 
subject to further analytical refinement.  Second, these findings are specific to the pilot study 
region.  They identify important areas for further research but should not be generalized.  In 
sum, they point to the value of an integrated, functional approach to assessing access to 
finance and suggest lessons for extending this approach broadly and systematically.   
4.1 Banks see serving BPL customers as a necessity rather than a profit 
opportunity and do so inefficiently. 
Based on responses from household surveys, seven bank branch managers, and a wide range 
of alternative sources of finance, neither state nor private banks appear to regard below 
poverty line (BPL) customers as attractive potential clients.  The Indian government 
encourages and in some cases requires opening a no-frills savings account to receive official 
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 Although not the central focus, we also conducted a streamlined business survey in several busy 
commercial areas to test different data collection designs in environments where longer surveys are difficult. 
11
 Translation and transcription were performed simultaneously by bilingual date entry officers due to 
difficulty of typing Bangla script.   
12
 Instead of field survey staff, supervisors and project associates conducted interviews with bank managers 
and money lenders due to the potentially sensitive nature of the conversations. 
payments (e.g., state pensions, NREGS payments, military salaries, etc.) and to participate in 
government subsidized loan schemes.  Such accounts have low or no minimum balances, a 
different fee structure, and typically relax identification (KYC) requirements.  Expansion of 
such accounts has been widely viewed as a first step towards financial inclusion; however, 
although 25% of households report having some form of a bank account, not one reported 
using a no-frills account.  This is consistent with RBI reports that the majority of all accounts 
opened under the current financial inclusion drive remain inactive.  Despite perceptions, no-
frills accounts carry significant real and perceived costs.  While all of the banks in our survey 
reported that their no-frills accounts had no transaction fees and zero or very low (less than 
Rs. 100) minimum balances, most households cited insufficient funds as the main reason for 
not opening a bank deposit account and several reported closing accounts because costs were 
too high.13  For example, Punjab National Bank’s no-frills account has a zero minimum 
balance, but households believed at least Rs. 1500 was required to open an account.  A few 
households also reported that opening an account required substantial side payments to 
branch managers.  Managers reported that if they were approach by a BPL customer 
interested in any financial services outside a government scheme, they would direct them to 
microfinance institutions.  However, as is well documented and heavily debated, 
microfinance institutions in India are prohibited from offering savings products and hence 
BPL households may find it difficult to access their optimal set of financial services. 
Mangers also report poor experiences with government schemes for lending to 
traditionally underserved populations.  For example, one manager claimed that it was 
effectively impossible to deny a government approved loan under the unemployed educated 
youth loan program (PMRY), but default rates are 30% to 50%.  We speculate that as a 
consequence, managers view all such programs as merely a cost of doing business 
Our interviews with bank managers and potential customers also raised a number of 
organizational issues that merit further study.  Taxi drivers seeking vehicle finance described 
nine to twelve month delays for loan document processing after paying a 25% deposit.  We 
were unable to determine if these delays were purely administrative, but they may be related 
to the banks’ desire to improve collateral quality.  Some potential borrowers reported that 
they were able to delay payment on bank vehicle loans by making side payments to collectors.  
In contrast, NBFCs typically processed vehicle loans in less than one month, charge modestly 
higher interest, and utilize more stringent remedies in the event of late payment. 
4.2 Community clubs, a heretofore undocumented financial institutions, are 
key sources of both funds and enforcement capacity 
Our functional survey identified a series of financial institutions that, to the best of our 
knowledge, have not been previously described: the community club.  Throughout the study 
area, various community clubs exist that provide loans to both club members and members of 
the community at large.  Examples include unregistered but organized groups of community 
moneylenders who pool resources and extend loans with the goal of making a profit, 
communal savings clubs, similar to ROSCAs or self-formed self-help groups (SHGs) that 
loan out of aggregated savings and religious or other community groups.  Interestingly, most 
of these groups, particularly the latter two types, often intermediate in loan disputes and 
connect potential borrowers to outside lenders.  In several cases, individuals and money 
lenders report enlisting such groups to serve as screening and enforcement agents for loans.  
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 The State Bank of India is considering imposing a small transaction fee on no-frills accounts to cover 
infrastructure costs related to initiating operations in rural areas (Business Standard, 24 October 2010). 
Before extending a new loan, moneylenders will not only approach a community club for 
reference checks on potential borrowers but will ask the club to agree to sanction borrowers 
in the event of non-payment.  That is, the clubs serve to reduce information asymmetries and 
mitigate risk within the financial supply chain.  There was no evidence of direct remuneration 
for this service, but we conjecture that the club derives a local social benefit (screening and 
enforcement activities not only utilize but enhance a club’s social capital) and benefits from 
links to outside capital sources.  In situations where informal credit and insurance is 
important, such links improve a community’s ability to insure aggregate shocks and may be 
particularly valuable (Townsend, 1992?).14 
Many households and small businesses reported a preference for community clubs to 
microfinance loans where available because of the built-in insurance aspect of community 
club loans—payments are typically rescheduled in response to financial shocks—and because 
of the clubs’ simple rule structure.  Potential and existing MFI clients complain of substantial 
paperwork and several days of “training” before joint-liability groups can request a loan.  
Community clubs also make exclusively individual-liability loans whereas MFIs in the study 
region remain focused on joint-liability lending.  
4.3 Distinctions between de jure and de facto rules are critical. 
There are substantial differences between the terms of financial contracts as written and the 
terms as implemented.  Moreover, potential clients’ beliefs about product terms and 
restrictions tend to be substantially less favourable than posted terms, creating an additional 
demand-side barrier to financial access.  Because banks do not make a profit from low-
income customers, they have little incentive to correct these misperceptions.15  This 
information gap extends beyond the divergence between posted and perceived fees described 
above.  The starkest example we found was the fact many households reported forfeiting 
savings deposits at banks when the account had been classified as inactive.  The RBI 
recommends treating an account as inoperative/dormant if there have been no transactions in 
the account for two years; however, many individuals reported their accounts being so 
classified after a period of only six months.  A recent RBI mandate seeks to reduce the hassle 
for customers seeking to reactivate dormant accounts;16 however, it does not stipulate precise 
procedures for reactivation beyond appropriate KYC due diligence and a prohibition against 
fees to reactivate.  In practice, depositors report substantial difficulty in submitting 
applications to reopen dormant accounts (many low-income individuals are illiterate or semi-
literate), difficult KYC requirements, and substantial charges, generally described as 
unofficial, to reinstate.  As a consequent, most individuals report writing off funds in dormant 
accounts and express an understandable reluctance to open accounts with any perceived risk 
of being classified as dormant.  This issue is not limited to standard deposit accounts.  
Households also report abandoning insurance policies rather than cashing them out when they 
cannot make instalment payments.  We were unable to determine if insurance companies 
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 While we are not aware of other research that documents similar institutions, private conversations 
between the author and Rob Townsend suggest that similar institutions exist and are an important part of the 
financial landscape in Thailand.  We believe they merit further study. 
15
 Some of these misperceptions may be the result of the very poor reputation held by financial service 
providers.  Several respondents report being cheated by life insurance companies or savings clubs.  Most others 
have heard of others being cheated.  A few individuals reported being asked for bribes from officers at financial 
institutions well-regarded by outsiders.  Most interestingly, the survey team uncovered a large Ponzi scheme 
operating in the study area.  The scheme was reported to the police and RBI and is currently under investigation. 
16
 See RBI Master Circular DBOD.No.Leg.BC.9/09.07.005/2009-10 dated 1 July, 2009 (available at 
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Notification/PDFs/78MCC010710_F.pdf).   
deliberately obfuscate cash-out provisions or whether households are simply unaware of 
these terms.  Taken as a whole, these findings stress the importance of understanding beliefs 
about and de facto terms of financial contracts rather than relying exclusively on official 
terms. 
4.4 Individuals learn practical lessons about finance through utilization, but 
even with experience lack basic financial literacy. 
Most households expressed an initial reluctance to access formal financial products, including 
borrowing from microfinance institutions which were generally perceived as having 
complicated rules and onerous training and meeting requirements.   However, once 
individuals borrow from a microfinance institution, they appear to rapidly develop as a 
financial consumer and navigate the competitive landscape.  Approximately 38% of our 
sample had borrowed from a microfinance institution.  Of those that had borrowed from an 
MFI, 40% reported having more than one loan outstanding at the same time.  Over 10% of 
borrowers had more than three loans outstanding, some through different branches or 
borrowing groups of the same MFI.  Interviews with microfinance institutions themselves 
suggest that even these seemingly high numbers may be below average.  One microfinance 
provider claimed that 85% of applicants have outstanding loans at the time of their initial 
application, and among those that do the mean number of loans outstanding is four.   
Interestingly, we do not find evidence that microfinance provides a first step in the 
migration towards formal finance.  Microfinance borrowers were no more likely than others 
to have an outstanding deposit or loan account with a formal bank (28%), nor are they more 
likely to express an interest in opening an account.  Neither does experience with formal or 
semi-formal finance appear associated with higher levels of financial literacy.  Fewer than 
half of respondents could correctly identify the more attractive loan as part of a basic 
financial literacy test; distressingly, this accuracy rate was independent of whether or not 
individuals maintained formal bank accounts or borrowed from MFIs.17   
4.5 Consumption smoothing is the primary financial need for households.  
Shopkeepers, employers, and informal loans from friends and family serve 
this role. 
As Collins et al (2009) document, consumption smoothing is perhaps the most important use 
of finance for poor households.  Median household income in our sample was approximately 
$3 per day (Rs. 130); however the most report highly variable income largely due to the 
uncertainty of obtaining work.  Even households with regular employment must cope with 
lumpy and delayed income.  Over 90% of the sample reports smoothing consumption with 
store credit.  Those households that utilize store credit to smooth consumption report 
borrowing from an average of just over three different shops, with food being the primary use.  
In our sample, store credit appears to be the primary source of consumption smoothing for 
households.  Households typically repay when feasible and are encouraged to settle their 
accounts each month, although few report ever fully repaying.  Almost all shops report giving 
products on credit to regular customers.  Shopkeepers do not require collateral (or rather, the 
loan is collateralized by reputation and the future commercial relationship) and frequently 
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 We asked a battery of 12 basic numeracy and financial literacy questions, which appear in section D of 
the household survey.  The referenced question, D.12, was “Suppose you need to borrow Rs. 1000.  Two people 
offer you a loan.  On loan requires that you pay back Rs. 1200 in one month.  The second loan requires you to 
pay back in one month Rs. 1000 plus 15% interest.  Which loan is the better deal for you?” 
restructure repayment in response to economic shocks.  Few report taking any action beyond 
reminders to collect debt, although some hint at becoming more forceful.18 
4.6 Other 
We also identified several items of what for now is primarily theoretical interest.  I describe 
one here as an example of the ancillary benefits from more systematic, open-ended, 
descriptive research. Informal insurance differs in important ways from the way it is 
generally understood.  A large body of literature describes the functioning of informal 
insurance networks, which serve as the primary source of smoothing idiosyncratic shocks for 
many low-income households (Townsend 1994; Morduch 1999; Ligon, Thomas et al. 2002).  
There is concern that increasing access to formal finance may crowd out these informal 
relationships and, in the short run, reduce welfare.  These networks are generally described as 
symmetric, bilateral, and reciprocal.  Two individuals have similar (or identical) wealth and 
income processes.  When one receives a negative shock, the other provides insurance, not 
with the expectation of future repayment but with the expectation of reciprocal insurance.  
That is, a similar transfer will be made if the tables are turned in the future.  In our sample, 
this is not the case.  Many transfers are unidirectional—from the relatively wealthy to the 
relatively poor—and they tend to be explicitly structured as loans, with repayment expected 
albeit flexibly.  This has profound implications for how these mechanisms interact with 
formal finance and evolve with increased economic and geographic mobility.  As such, they 
merit further study. 
5. Discussion 
This section recommends next steps to integrate the methodological lessons from this 
research into a comprehensive strategy for improving our understanding of access to finance 
and expanding our evidence base for policy.  It discusses limitations to the current approach 
and opportunities for improvement.  Finally, it describes anticipated outputs to follow directly 
from this research over the next 12 to 18 months. 
The principal goal of this pilot was to test an improved method for gathering information 
about access to finance.  As described below, analysis of the pilot data will continue through 
summer 2011; however, we can already draw clear methodological lessons.  Context matters.  
While short, predefined surveys covering access to finance are useful for generating 
comparative statistics and creating measurable objectives, they are insufficient to identify 
evidence gaps or to direct research that can inform policy.  Individuals, firms, and markets in 
low-income countries produce creative solutions to financial needs.  Both the policy and 
research communities would benefit greatly from a systematic data collection effort that was 
capable of identifying both impediments to financial access and innovative solutions as they 
emerge.   
The approach taken by this pilot is not the answer.  The open-ended questions necessary 
for such a flexible survey have not, to our knowledge, been implemented in a scalable fashion.  
We therefore cast a wide, exploratory net across a range of potential questions designed to 
ascertain how individuals actually use or fail to use finance.  Our survey instruments were not 
intended to scale.  The household module alone generated nearly 3,500 pages of transcribed 
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 Households describe social pressure and the possibility of being unable to shop at a particular store as the 
primary motivations to repay.  In certain circumstances, shopkeepers may use alternative means.  One 
shopkeeper explains: “If a person does not repay their debt money, I am compelled to misbehave with them.” 
notes, and completing the full data analysis will take considerable time.  However, they can 
be distilled to develop a functional approach to understanding access to finance that can 
improve our growth policy and should be scaled.  Based on the pilot, we make the following 
recommendations: 
1. Develop a short battery of qualitative questions that can be completed in less than 30 
minutes.19  These questions should include (a) a subset of functional usage questions, (b) 
identification of alternative sources based on these answers, and (c) a discussion of 
perceived strengths and weaknesses of identified sources as well as any formal 
alternatives not mentioned by the respondent (e.g., health insurance or formal bank 
savings). 
2. Preliminary analysis of the pilot interviews suggest that for households, the functional 
questions should include how the household: (a) financed the purchase of a large 
consumer durable, e.g., a television in the last one to two years; (b) made a predictable, 
lumpy expenditure, such as school fees or festival outlays; (c) made an unforeseen, lumpy 
expenditure, such as large medical expenditures and how it plans to do so in the future; 
and (d) how the household smooths food consumption.   
3. For businesses, the questions should include how the firm: (a) financed its last inventory 
purchase and how it decided how much inventory to purchase; (b) financed its last large 
capital expenditure, if any, and how it decided on that particular expenditure; and (c) was 
initially financed and how it financed growth. 
4. The precise set of questions should be determined based on piloting in other locations 
both within India and in other countries.  
5. For both households and firms, once a source or product is identified, surveyors should 
ask about the contractual terms and the history of the relationship (e.g., how the 
respondent picked a particular products) before asking how this financial need would 
have been met if the utilized product had been unavailable. 
6. Scale up the survey in representative urban, peri-urban and rural areas in a range of 
locations.  For a first wave, we would recommend three Indian states at different levels of 
financial development (e.g., Bihar, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu) and at least two 
African countries (e.g., Ghana and Rwanda).   
7. In each area, a viable rollout plan would be: first, implement a revised, full (two-hour) 
survey with approximately 10 households and 10 businesses.  Review translations 
immediately for any anomalies and make any necessary changes to short survey.  
Implement short survey in 25 to 50 households in a defined geographical location.  The 
precise number of firms to be interviewed depends on the density of economic activity.  
Note that clustering is crucial for identifying sources of finance and being able to describe 
the competitive landscape.  The total cost per survey area would be approximately 
£7,000-£20,000 depending on firm coverage and local economic conditions. 
8. Ideally, the short, qualitative survey would be conducted in tandem with one of the large-
scale, quantitative surveys such as FinScope or the World Bank/Gallup poll.  Any 
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 Thirty minutes represents the first fall off period in respondents’ attention.  The next generally appears at 
about 90 minutes.   
patterns in the responses would help add depth to the large-scale surveys and link 
qualitative data back to measurable statistics for comparison across time and locations.20 
9. Interviews with financial service providers are a critical component, but pilot results 
suggest they are hard to systematize for three reasons.  First, the very nature of this 
exercise highlights that financial service providers are idiosyncratic.  Only a small 
fraction of relevant data can be easily coded.  Second, access can be a challenge.  For 
example, securing interviews with the 12 moneylenders in our sample took repeated visits 
over two months, with information often provided incrementally.  Third, as described 
above, there are large differences between posted rules and actual practices.  The former 
can be gathered with relative ease, but understanding the latter is necessary if we are to 
effectively address policy challenges. 
10. Based on the insights from this pilot and future surveys, analyse which aspects of 
financial access are likely to be susceptible to influence by policy, whether it be providing 
new opportunities or removing obstacles, and where policy is likely to have the greatest 
impact.  This can help focus policy reform efforts on those areas most likely to benefit 
growth and inclusion.   
While providing a basis for more informative data collection was the primary aim of this 
project, we expect it will generate a number of additional deliverables over the next 12 to 18 
months.  Chief among these is a detailed descriptive summary of the financial network in the 
pilot study area.  The most similar existing work is Ruthven (2002); however, this output will 
also include detailed information on the supply-side of the market and a careful description of 
the relative merits of available financial products.  In addition, we will look more closely at 
shop credit, a heretofore overlooked source of finance, which appears to be the primary 
mechanism for income smoothing in the study area.  Preliminary findings suggest that this 
generalizes to other low-income populations.  Given its importance for household finance and 
as a use of funds for shopkeepers, the structure of store credit may have important 
implications for how individuals evaluate the relative merits of alternative financial products 
and migrate towards formal inclusion.  Moreover, the personal nature of these financial 
arrangements appears to place natural bounds on firm growth and merits further study.  
Longer term, we identified significant principal-agent problems within financial institutions. 
Careful documentation of these issues will serve as grist for specialists in organizational 
economics to turn their attention to financial institutions in low-income countries.21 
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 One limitation of the pilot was our inability to implement either of these surveys in our setting.  FinMark 
Trust considers its actual survey instruments proprietary, and we were unable to obtain a copy for our purposes.  
We considered implementing some sections of the World Bank/NCAER Rural Access to Finance Survey, but 
determined that he 39-page survey increased the total interview time well beyond respondents’ reasonable 
attention spans.  The Gallup financial access module is an appropriate length, but was unavailable at the time 
filed work began. 
21
 The International Growth Centre’s finance program has added the organization of financial entities to its 
core research themes. 
 References 
Ashraf, N., D. S. Karlan, et al. (2006). "Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a 
Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines." Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(2): 
635-672. 
Banerjee, A. V., E. Duflo, et al. (2010). The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a 
Randomized Evaluation. 
Besley, T. (1995). Savings, Credit and Insurance. Handbook of Development Economics. 
J. Behrman and T. N. Srinivasan. Amsterdam, Elsevier Science. 3A: 2123-2207. 
Burgess, R. and R. Pande (2003). Do Rural Banks Matter? Evidence from the Indian 
Social Banking Experiment. 
Collins, D., J. Morduch, et al. (2009). Portfolios of the Poor: How the World's Poor Live 
on $2 a Day, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Dercon, S., J. De Weerdt, et al. (2006). "Group-based funeral insurance in Ethiopia and 
Tanzania." World Development 34(4): 685-703. 
Dupas, P. and J. Robinson (2009). Savings Constraints and Microenterprise Development: 
Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper. 
Ghatak, M. and T. W. Guinnane (1999). "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: 
Theory and Practice." Journal of Development Economics 60(1): 195-228. 
Karlan, D. and J. Zinman (2010). "Expanding credit access: Using randomized supply 
decisions to estimate the impacts." Review of Financial Studies 23(1): 433. 
Karlan, D. and J. Zinman (2010). "Expanding microenterprise credit access: Using 
randomized supply decisions to estimate the impacts in Manila." 
Levine, R. (2005). "Finance and growth: Theory and evidence." Handbook of Economic 
Growth 1: 865-934. 
Ligon, E., J. P. Thomas, et al. (2002). "Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited 
Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies." Review of Economic Studies 
69(1): 209-244. 
Morduch, J. (1999). "Between the state and the market: Can informal insurance patch the 
safety net?" The World Bank Research Observer 14(2): 187. 
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales (1998). "Financial dependence and growth." American 
Economic Review 88(3): 559. 
Ruthven, O. (2002). "Money mosaics: financial choice and strategy in a West Delhi 
squatter settlement." Journal of International Development 14(2): 249-271. 
Stiglitz, J. E. and A. Weiss (1981). "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information." American Economic Review 71(3): 393-410. 
Townsend, R. (1994). "Risk and Insurance in Village India." Econometrica 62(4): 539-
591. 
Udry, C. (1990). "Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural 
Economy." World Bank Economic Review 4(3): 251-269. 
Wurgler, J. (2000). "Financial markets and the allocation of capital." Journal of Financial 






Appendix 4.1: Survey Instrument, Households 
 
